CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1531
3 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MONGOLIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF MONGOLIA RELATING TO A SERIES OF NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN

I have the honour to forward the statement made by the Ministry of External Relations, Mongolia.

I kindly request you to circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Suh-Ochir Bold
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, MONGOLIA

Mongolia strongly condemns a series of nuclear tests conducted by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in May last week in defiance of the international community's call for restraint.

It is considered that these tests would undermine international efforts aimed at the attainment of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, comprehensive nuclear test ban and eventually at establishing a world free from nuclear weapons. These tests threaten to escalate an arms race in South Asia and to destabilize the situation in the region.

Mongolia fully associates itself with the international calls that both Pakistan and India join as soon as possible and unconditionally the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and discontinue their nuclear weapon programs.

Ulaanbaatar, 29 May 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1532
3 June 1998

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH and RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELARUS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS ON 1 JUNE 1998

I have the honour to forward to you a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on 1 June 1998 concerning the underground nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan.

I would be most grateful if you would arrange for this statement to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): S. Agurtsou
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

It was with alarm and anxiety that the Republic of Belarus learned of the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan.

On the threshold of the twenty-first century, the series of nuclear tests carried out push the world towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons, mark a step in the nuclear arms race and create significant additional obstacles to further reductions in nuclear armaments.

These actions run counter to the efforts of the world community to strengthen the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global and regional levels, which is a very important factor in international stability and security.

The Republic of Belarus, which a few years ago made a historic choice in renouncing its existing nuclear potential, and which is a party to a number of major agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, cannot but feel particular concern and alarm at this turn of events.

The Republic of Belarus calls on all countries with military nuclear programmes which have not become parties to the NPT to review their current nuclear policy and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and to work for a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, on which mankind is pinning its hopes for a nuclear-free world in the twenty-first century.

The events of recent days have heightened our alarm about a possible chain reaction involving nuclear proliferation not only in the South Asian region but also beyond. The lack of legal obligations vis-à-vis the international community will furnish a favourable context in that respect.

It is well known that the Republic of Belarus, on the basis of its consistent anti-nuclear policy, its fears for the fate of future generations and the fate of the European continent and the world as a whole, and in the light of contemporary realities, has called and continues to call on all countries to support the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-free space in Central and Eastern Europe.

We in the Republic of Belarus are convinced that the achievement of this goal will strengthen security and trust on the continent, will prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and will constitute a significant step towards the further consolidation of peace and stability in Europe and throughout the world.

In our view, all countries which do not possess nuclear weapons could assume agreed obligations relating to the complete renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory.

Minsk, 1 June 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1533
4 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED ON 29 MAY 1998 BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA CONCERNING THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CARRIED OUT BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the United Nations Office at Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the statement issued on 29 May 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the underground nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan.

The Permanent Mission of Lithuania would be grateful if this statement is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

GE.98-62230

LITHUNIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

S T A T E M E N T

29 May, 19987

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania expresses its great regret and is concerned about the series of underground nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan on May 28 as well as those conducted by India on May 11 and 13. By carrying out these tests, Pakistan and India openly ignored the efforts of the world community to stop the threat of nuclear armament and increased regional confrontation.

The Lithuanian MFA calls on Pakistan and India to refrain from statements and actions which could complicate the tense situation, and at the same, time seek the re-establishment of bilateral dialogue and stability in the region. The MFA urges both states to immediately announce a moratorium on nuclear weapons development programs and sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1534
28 May 1998

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF COLOMBIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE SECTION ENTITLED "DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" FROM THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, HELD IN CARTAGENA DE INDIAS ON 19 AND 20 MAY 1998

I attach the section entitled "Disarmament and international security" from the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, on 19 and 20 May this year. Please distribute it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Gustavo Castro Guerrero
Ambassador
Head of Mission

GE.98-63206 (E)

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MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 19-20 May, 1998

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

101. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated that with the end of the cold war, there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. They noted and welcomed the various international initiatives which stress that with the end of the cold war the opportunity now exists for the international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of the highest priority. They also noted that the present situation whereby nuclear-weapon states insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet monopolise the right to own them, is highly discriminatory, unstable and cannot be sustained. These weapons continued to represent a threat to the survival of the mankind. They recalled that the Cartagena Summit had called for the adoption of an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. They once again called upon the international community to join them in negotiating and implementing universal, non discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence-building measures.

102. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated their call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee to start in 1998 negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The Conference on Disarmament shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, regarding this issue, that have been submitted to it. They also insisted on the need to conclude a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context they regretted that some nuclear weapons states had adopted inflexible postures which prevented the Conference on Disarmament from commencing these negotiations.

103. In this connection, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated that a number of Non-Aligned Movement countries had taken collective initiatives at the United Nations General Assembly sessions to underscore the need for urgent action in the field of nuclear disarmament, as mandated by the Cartagena Summit. They recognised all of the useful proposals put forward by members of Non-Aligned Movement in the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament including the useful work done by Non-Aligned Movement members of the Conference on Disarmament in developing a Program of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons within a time-bound framework.

104. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation expressed concern over the failure of nuclear weapon States to demonstrate a genuine commitment with regard to complete nuclear disarmament, and to provide universal, unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear weapon States, and urged the nuclear weapon States to immediately commence and conclude without delay negotiations on these assurances.

105. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation noted the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Effective international arrangement to assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding assurances to all non-nuclear weapon States.

106. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". In this connection, they reiterated their call upon all the States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of threat of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

107. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations noted with concern that undue restrictions on export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They emphasised that proliferation concerns should be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. In this regard they also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any member States to use the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical co-operation as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's Statute.

108. Consistent with the decisions taken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, of Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of States parties to the NPT called upon all States, particularly the nuclear weapon States, to fulfil their commitments, particularly those related to Article VI of the Treaty. They also emphasised the need to ensure and facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination under IAEA safeguards. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

109. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of States parties to the NPT took note with regret at the outcome of the deliberations of the Second Preparatory Committee held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May, 1998. They further regretted that the Committee could not achieve a substantive result due to the insistence of one delegation to support the nuclear policies of a non party to the NPT. They called upon the Preparatory Committees up to and including the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to engage immediately in substantive work for the meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document, and the resolutions on Middle East. They further called upon the Preparatory Committee to make specific time available at its future sessions to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, and for the 2000 NPT Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

110. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities - operational or under construction - poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. They recognised the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

111. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention welcomed the increasing number of ratifications of the Convention and invited the declared possessors of chemical weapons and other States who have still not ratified it to do so as soon as possible with the view to its universality. They also underlined the urgency of satisfactorily resolving the unresolved issues in the framework of the Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with a view to paving the ground for the effective, full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention. In this context, they reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international co-operation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.

112. While asserting that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention inherently precludes the use of biological weapons, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated the decision by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference that the use by the States parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention. In this connection they noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Article I of the Convention to include the prohibition of use of biological weapons and urged an early reply from the States parties to the inquiries by the depositories on this proposal. The Ministers noted the progress achieved so far negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and reaffirmed the decision of the Fourth Review Conference urging the conclusion of the negotiations by the Ad Hoc group as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and for it to submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States parties, to be considered at a Special Conference. Therefore, artificial deadlines should be avoided. They also expressed their concern at any attempts to reduce the scope and importance of issues related to Article X of the Convention. Ensured access for peaceful purposes to the relevant materials, equipment and technology is essential to safeguard the economic interests of developing countries. Substantive progress in strengthening the application and full operationalisation of Article X is thus crucial for the conclusion of a universally acceptable and legally binding instrument designed to strengthen the Convention.

113. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation expressed particular concern over the illicit transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their accumulation and proliferation in many countries, which constituted a serious threat to the population and to national and regional security and were a factor contributing to the destabilisation of States. They urged States to take steps to deal effectively, through administrative and legislative means, with the increasing problem of illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons which exacerbate tensions leading to strife, conflict and terrorism, and impact negatively on the socio-economic development of affected countries. In this regard, they welcomed the adoption of guidelines in 1996 for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 September 1991 by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Moreover, they welcomed the initiative by His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare, President of

the Republic of Mali, on the establishment of a moratorium on the production, transfer and illicit traffic of light arms in West Africa, adopted by member States of ECOWAS within the framework of on-going discussions and referring to the creation of a mechanism to prevent, handle and rule on conflicts in the sub-region.

114. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation stressed the importance of transparency in armaments, in view of the dangerous consequences to the international peace and security that the development, production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and the excessive production of conventional arms have. They encouraged States, taking into account the legitimate requirement of States for self-defence and the specific characteristics of each region, to consider appropriate initiatives at multilateral, regional and national levels to promote transparency in armaments as an important element for building confidence and security.

115. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation noted the opening for signature in Ottawa during December 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. They emphasised that elimination of landmines should take into account the legitimate national security concern of States as well as their legitimate rights to use appropriate measures for self-defence.

116. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation called on States to become parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and the Protocols thereto, and called upon States parties to the CCW to express their consent to be bound to its Amended Protocol II on Landmines and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons with a view to their entry into force as soon as possible.

117. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Heads of Delegation called upon the international community to provide the necessary assistance to landmine clearance operations as well as to the rehabilitation of the victims in the landmine affected countries. They further called for international assistance to ensure full access of affected countries to material, equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance. The Ministers also called for continued humanitarian assistance for victims of landmines.

118. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Heads of Delegation expressed concern about the residue of the Second World War, particularly in the form of landmines which cause human and material damage and obstruct development plans in some Non-Aligned countries. They called on the States responsible for laying the mines outside their territories to assume responsibility for the landmines, to cooperate with the affected countries, to provide the necessary information, maps and technical assistance for their clearance, to contribute towards defrayal of the costs of clearance and provide compensation for any ensuing losses.

119. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation considered the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1. In this context, they welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The Ministers and Heads of Delegation considered the question of the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in other parts of the world and agreed that this should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1. The

Ministers welcomed the efforts of Mongolia to institutionalise its status as a single State nuclear-weapon-free zone.

120. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without delay, and to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and they condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. They are of the view that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. They further welcomed the initiative by H.E. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. They stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

121. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation expressed their concern over the Israeli-Turkish military alliance as well as the naval manoeuvres carried out in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and the dangers that such manoeuvres pose to the security of the region.

122. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation stated that in order to enhance international security and stability, all States parties to non-proliferation, arms limitations and disarmament treaties should comply with and implement all provisions of such treaties. They emphasised that questions of non-compliance by States Parties should be resolved in a manner consistent with such treaties. They further emphasised that any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the United Nations Charter or in certain circumstances under relevant provisions of multilateral treaties on non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress of violations of their provisions. Such deviations would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the Conference on Disarmament. They underlined that circumventing or undermining the provisions of existing treaties will seriously prejudice the role of the Conference.

123. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reaffirmed that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and could be pursued simultaneously. They urged States in various regions of the world to negotiate agreements to promote greater balance in conventional armaments and restraint in the production and acquisition of conventional arms and, where necessary, for their progressive and balanced reduction, with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security. They stressed that the peaceful resolution of regional and inter-State disputes is essential for the creation of conditions which would enable States to divert their resources from armaments to economic growth and development. Regional disarmament initiatives, to be practical, needed to take into

account the special characteristics of each region and enhance the security of every State of the region concerned. The question of the accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of the States for self-defence should also be addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region.

124. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation, took note of the relevant paragraphs of the United Nation General Assembly Resolutions 52/12 A & B on international peace, security and disarmament, and insisted on the need that its implementation respects fully the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention on the internal affairs of States.

125. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations acknowledged that under the reform process, it was decided to re-establish at the UN Secretariat the Department on Disarmament headed by an Under Secretary General from a Non-Aligned country. They stressed their hope that this will contribute to greater disarmament efforts towards achieving general and complete disarmament in conformity with priorities set out in SSOD I and relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 52/220.

126. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation expressed once again their support for the convening of the IV Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. They welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly, by consensus, of the resolution on the Convening of the IV Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. They took note of the deliberations on the matter held by the United Nations Disarmament Commission and instructed the Co-ordinating Bureau to entrust the Non-Aligned Movement Working Group on Disarmament with the task of pursuing further the holding of the IV Special Session and the related co-ordination during the preparatory process. In this context, they reaffirmed the need for SSOD IV to review and assess the implementation of SSOD I.

127. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation welcomed the decision adopted by the General Assembly on maintaining and revitalising the three Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1535
5 June 1998

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE HOLY SEE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESS OFFICE OF THE HOLY SEE CONCERNING THE RECENT NUCLEAR TESTS

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the attached text of a statement made by the Director of the Press Office of the Holy See concerning the recent nuclear tests.

Please take the necessary steps for this text to be issued as a Conference document.

(Signed): Giuseppe Bertello
Apostolic Nuncio
Permanent Observer

GE.98-62271 (E)

STATEMENT MADE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESS OFFICE OF THE HOLY SEE CONCERNING THE RECENT NUCLEAR TESTS

The position of the Holy See is that set out publicly by Pope John Paul II in his statement to the diplomatic corps on 13 January 1996:

> "The Holy See is of the opinion that, in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the banning of tests and the further development of these weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation are closely linked and must be achieved as quickly as possible under effective international control. These are steps towards general and total disarmament which the international community as a whole should accomplish without delay."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1536
5 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA

Statements made by Mr. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28, 29 and 30 May 1998 regarding Pakistan's nuclear tests

28 MAY 1998

I STRONGLY CONDEMN THE NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN TODAY. I WILL BE ANNOUNCING TOMORROW THE MEASURES AUSTRALIA WILL TAKE IN RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS.

AS WITH THE TESTS CONDUCTED BY INDIA, PAKISTAN'S ACTIONS HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY AND FLY IN THE FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORM AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING.

PAKISTAN'S DECISION TO TEST HAS BEEN MADE IN SPITE OF THE STRONG INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF INDIA'S TESTS AND DIRECT PLEAS TO PAKISTAN BY AUSTRALIA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TO EMULATE INDIA'S REGRETTABLE EXAMPLE.

A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA WILL EXACERBATE RATHER THAN SOLVE REGIONAL SECURITY TENSIONS. PAKISTAN AND INDIA SHOULD BOTH SIGN THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY IMMEDIATELY, AND SHOULD THROW THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY.

I WILL CONTACT THE PAKISTANI HIGH COMMISSIONER TOMORROW TO CONVEY TO HIM AUSTRALIA'S DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT AND REGRET AND TO URGE HIS GOVERNMENT TO DESIST FROM ANY FURTHER TESTING. THE SAME MESSAGE WILL BE REGISTERED BY OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN ISLAMABAD.

PAKISTAN'S ACTIONS WILL IN NO WAY WEAKEN AUSTRALIA'S DETERMINATION, SHARED BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TO SEE AN END TO THE ERA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE WILL CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY TO PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE, AND TO URGE PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO JOIN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

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29 MAY 1998

FOLLOWING PAKISTAN'S ILL-ADVISED DECISION TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR TESTS OVERNIGHT, I AM TODAY ANNOUNCING A SERIES OF MEASURES THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL APPLY AGAINST PAKISTAN.

THE FOLLOWING MEASURES - SIMILAR TO THOSE IMPOSED ON INDIA - WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY:

- RECALL FOR CONSULTATIONS OF OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER FROM ISLAMABAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

- SUSPENSION OF BILATERAL DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, INCLUDING THE RECALL OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ADVISER STATIONED IN ISLAMABAD AND THE CANCELLATION OF OFFICER EXCHANGES AND OTHER DEFENCE-RELATED VISITS. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL CURRENTLY TRAINING IN PAKISTAN WILL BE WITHDRAWN. AUSTRALIA WILL CANCEL ALL PLANNED VISITS TO AUSTRALIA BY PAKISTANI DEFENCE PERSONNEL;

- EXCLUSION OF NON-HUMANITARIAN AID. CONSISTENT WITH MY DECISION TO PRESERVE THE HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT OF THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO INDIA, THE PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE. HOWEVER, I HAVE CANCELLED MY DECISION TO DOUBLE AID TO PAKISTAN NEXT YEAR. THIS WAS CONTINGENT UPON PAKISTAN REFRAINING FROM TESTING;

- SUSPENSION OF MINISTERIAL AND SENIOR OFFICIAL VISITS;

- WITH MY SUPPORT, THE PRESIDING OFFICERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE DECIDED IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONTINUE WITH THE VISIT OF THE PAKISTAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN AUSTRALIA. THAT VIEW HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE DELEGATION;

- IN ADDITION TO THESE BILATERAL STEPS, AUSTRALIA HAS TAKEN SEVERAL IMMEDIATE STEPS TO RESPOND IN MULTILATERAL FORA TO PAKISTAN'S TESTS, NAMELY (1) CALLING FOR AN EARLY "SPECIAL" SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER; (2) TAKING A LEAD IN HAVING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CTBTO PREPARATORY COMMISSION ISSUE A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE TESTS ON BEHALF OF PREPCOM MEMBERS; AND (3) SEEKING A SPECIAL ITEM ON NUCLEAR TESTING AT THE JUNE BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING OF THE IAEA.

I SPOKE THIS MORNING WITH THE PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSIONER TO CONVEY TO HIM AUSTRALIA'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF HIS COUNTRY'S ACTION. PAKISTAN'S ACTION IS A FLAGRANT DEFIANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION NORMS AND HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY. IT IS SAD AND DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING THAT PAKISTAN HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON THE DIRECT PLEAS OF AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. INSTEAD PAKISTAN HAS DECIDED TO JOIN INDIA IN ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

I CALL AGAIN ON BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA IMMEDIATELY TO SIGN AND RATIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WITHOUT CONDITION, AND ACCEDE TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

THE SAME MESSAGE WILL BE REGISTERED BY OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN ISLAMABAD.

I REITERATE THAT IT IS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING THAT, IN THE FACE OF OUR DIRECT REPRESENTATIONS, PAKISTAN HAS CHOSEN A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH CASTS SUCH A MAJOR SHADOW ON WHAT HAD OTHERWISE BEEN A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP.

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30 MAY 1998

I STRONGLY CONDEMN THE CONDUCT OF FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTS BY PAKISTAN. I AM PROFOUNDLY DISAPPOINTED THAT PAKISTAN HAS SEEN FIT TO ADD TO THE FOLLY OF ITS TESTS ON 28 MAY. IT IS DEEPLY REGRETTABLE THAT THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN ABSOLUTE DISREGARD FOR THE MANY, DIRECT APPEALS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND HAS WILFULLY TURNED ITS BACK ON THE SINCERE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENCOURAGE REASON TO PREVAIL. THIS ACTION DEFIES THE HOPES OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE FOR A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR TESTING.

I ANNOUNCED ON 29 MAY THE MEASURES AUSTRALIA HAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS. THE SECOND SET ONLY STRENGTHENS THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION THAT ANY NUCLEAR TESTING COUNTRY SHOULD BEAR THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE INTENSE INTERNATIONAL OPPROBRIUM SUCH ACTS DESERVE.

A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA WOULD NOT SIMPLY THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE IMMEDIATE REGION. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. AUSTRALIA STRONGLY URGES PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO CEASE THEIR DANGEROUS ACTS OF BRINKMANSHIP.

I CALL ON BOTH COUNTRIES TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR TESTING AND IMMEDIATELY SIGN AND RATIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, TO JOIN IMMEDIATELY THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A "CUT-OFF" TREATY BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES.

THE AUSTRALIAN GEOLOGICAL SURVEY ORGANISATION DETECTED AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION THAT TOOK PLACE AT 16:55 (AUSTRALIAN EASTERN STANDARD TIME) ON 30 MAY IN SOUTHWESTERN PAKISTAN. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT THE YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION WAS LESS THAN 10 KILOTONNES OF TNT.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1537
5 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON 29 MAY 1998 CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED RECENTLY BY PAKISTAN

I have the honour to transmit to you a Press Release issued by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 29 May 1998 concerning the nuclear tests recently conducted by the Government of Pakistan.

I would be most grateful if you could make the necessary arrangements for its distribution as an official document to all members and participating delegations of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Agus Tarmidzi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-62283

No. : 24/PR/V98

PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY H.E. ALI ALATAS, FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDONESIA, CONCERNING PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS

As in the case of the nuclear tests recently carried out by India, Indonesia cannot, as a party to the Non-Proliferation treaty and a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, condone the carrying out of nuclear weapons tests by any country at any time, including those conducted by Pakistan recently.

The series of nuclear tests conducted in the Asian sub-continent have inevitably increased tensions in the region, triggering a new arms race and keeping us away from the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament which have been consistently pursued by the international community ever since the first atomic bomb was exploded. Indonesia deeply regrets this development.

Indonesia recognizes the right of every country to determine its own national security interests and the ways to protect those interests. However, as a country which believes in the principles and objectives of a nuclear-free world, we are of the view that wisdom dictates that national security policy be carried out without the use of nuclear weapons.

Jakarta, 29 May 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1538
5 June 1998

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 3 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PRESS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC ON 28 MAY 1998, A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE RIO GROUP ON 29 MAY 1998 AND RESOLUTION C/E/RES.39 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1998 BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL)

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and, in connection with the nuclear tests carried out by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has the honour to request the distribution of the following documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament:

1. A press communiqué issued by the Government of the Argentine Republic on 28 May 1998 (annex I);

2. A communiqué issued by the Rio Group on 29 May 1998 (annex II);

3. Resolution C/E/RES.39 adopted on 29 May 1998 by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) (annex III).

ANNEX I

PRESS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

ARGENTINA DEPLORES PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS

The Government of the Argentine Republic, further to its press communiqué of 12 May on Indian nuclear tests, deplores the carrying out of nuclear explosions by Pakistan.

These events increase the risk of a nuclear arms race which could have adverse consequences for peace and security in the region, and for the efforts of the international community to promote non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Argentina calls on the friendly nations involved to put an end to these actions and promptly ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Argentina also reiterates its firm commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and its conviction that refraining from developing and/or possessing such weapons, as well as complete transparency in this area, offer the best guarantee for stable peace and security in the region and throughout the world and for friendship between nations, as the excellent situation in the South American region demonstrates.

Buenos Aires, 28 May 1998

ANNEX II

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE RIO GROUP

The countries of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Rio Group) reiterate their condemnation of nuclear-weapon tests and deplore those carried out on 28 May by Pakistan.

The countries of the Rio Group consider that the resumption of nuclear testing constitutes a dangerous step backwards in the persistent efforts of the international community to secure the complete elimination of nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of weapons of this type.

They also reiterate their deep concern at the risk that exercises like this one and those carried out by India on 11 and 13 May, which prompted widespread opposition on the part of the international community, will lead to the outbreak of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and express their concern that these actions may endanger international peace.

The countries of the Rio Group urge the Governments of Pakistan and India to enter into an irreversible commitment vis-à-vis the international community to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to renounce nuclear tests of all types and to accede promptly to the international instruments on this subject.

Panama City, 29 May 1998

ANNEX III

RESOLUTION C/E/Res.39 OF THE OPANAL COUNCIL ON THE NUCLEAR TESTS CARRIED OUT BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

The member and observer States of the OPANAL Council

Bearing in mind that the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, established in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, places on the member countries the inescapable duty to preserve that state of affairs and reaffirms their commitment to contribute to peace;

Recalling resolution C/E/Res.38 of 14 May 1998;

Reiterating their strongest condemnation of the carrying out of any type of nuclear-weapon testing in any part of the world,

Decide:

1. To express their forceful opposition to the military nuclear tests carried out in Pakistan on 28 May 1998 and their concern at the possibility that those tests and those carried out recently by India may lead to a nuclear arms race in South Asia.

2. To call on the Governments of Pakistan and India to sign the nuclear non-proliferation instruments promptly and participate in the negotiating process that will make possible nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

3. To urge the Governments of Pakistan and India to enter into an irreversible commitment vis-à-vis the international community to renounce nuclear tests of all types.

4. To entrust to the Secretary-General the task of transmitting this resolution to the Governments of Pakistan and India, all the member and associated States of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

(Adopted at the 36th special meeting, held on 29 May 1998)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1539
8 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE SWEDISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 12 MAY 1998 AND A PRESS STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF SWEDEN ON 28 MAY 1998

I have the honour to transmit to you the texts of a Press release issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 12 May 1998, and a Press Statement by the Foreign Minister of Sweden on 28 May 1998.

I shall be grateful if these texts are circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Lars Norberg
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12 May, 1998

Press release on 12 May 1998 by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on India's nuclear tests.

"I am dismayed. India's nuclear testing is totally unacceptable. The massive criticism from the world community shows that India has taken the wrong path," the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs Lena Hjelm-Wallén, stated at a seminar on nuclear disarmament in Stockholm on Tuesday.

"We have reached a point where new political force is needed in nuclear disarmament work. After a period of success in connection with the end of the cold war, there are signs today of a weakening, inter alia in the START process. There have been no negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since 1996," the Minister said.

"The nuclear weapon states should immediately take their nuclear weapons off alert and provide assurances through a legally binding international agreement that they will not expose states that have refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons, to the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons," Mrs Hjelm-Wallén said. "The idea of being able to use nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons must be emphatically rejected."

"India, Israel and Pakistan must now take their responsibility and become parties to the almost universal Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT. New states or groups that acquire nuclear weapons create very serious threats to future security," the Minister said.

28 May 1998

Press statement on 28 May 1998 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Lena Hjelm-Wallén on Pakistan's nuclear weapons test

"Pakistan's test explosion must be strongly and unequivocally condemned.

"In spite of the international community's urgent and forceful requests Pakistan has followed India's irresponsible example and taken this dangerous step.

"The Pakistani nuclear test means a further escalation of the situation in the region which is already very serious. This spiral of nuclear tests seriously threatens international peace and security and must absolutely be stopped.

"I urge Pakistan and India to take the necessary measures as soon as possible to reverse this extremely dangerous development. Both parties must fully consider their responsibility and realize the necessity of dialogue and the assumption of joint responsibility for peace and security in the region by peaceful means.

"I also urge Pakistan and India to accede without delay and unconditionally to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

"At the same time it is the responsibility of the five nuclear weapons states to show the way by taking prompt and concrete action for intensified nuclear disarmament with the aim to achieve the complete abolition of these weapons.

"In today's consultations in the UN Security Council Sweden will raise the question of Pakistan's nuclear tests."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1540
8 June 1998

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 28 MAY 1998

I have the honour to forward to you the text of a statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 28 May 1998.

I would be grateful if you would issue this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participant States of the CD.

(Signed) V. Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 28 MAY 1998

Russia expresses the deepest concern at the testing of nuclear devices by Pakistan on 28 May 1998. This action was taken despite urgent appeals by the world community to Islamabad to display restraint and not to follow the principle of "an eye for an eye" in response to the nuclear explosions carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998.

It is to be regretted that the Pakistani leaders were unable to control their emotions and demonstrate circumspection and prudence at an extremely fateful moment.

The confrontation and rivalry which have continued between India and Pakistan for many years have now acquired a completely new nuclear dimension which is highly dangerous for mankind as a whole. A real threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons around the planet is emerging.

Russia considers that the international non-proliferation regime should be made universal in nature through its extension to cover all States without exception. It once again urgently appeals to Pakistan, as well as to India, to heed the voice of the world community, renounce further testing and accede without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1541
9 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA WITH REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR TESTS EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN

I have the honour to enclose copies of the statements made by the Government of the Republic of South Africa with regard to the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and Pakistan. It would be appreciated if these statements could be circulated as official documents of the Conference.

(Signed) J.S. Selebi
Ambassador

GE.98-62381

PRESS STATEMENT : 13 MAY 1998

SOUTH AFRICA REITERATES DEEP CONCERN AT SUBSEQUENT INDIAN NUCLEAR TESTS

The South African Government is deeply concerned at the further two nuclear tests conducted by India on 13 May 1998 and regrets this development.

As a matter of principle South Africa opposes all nuclear tests since they do not contribute to promoting world peace and security.

South Africa believes that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation.

South Africa repeats the hope that these tests do not result in an arms race in South Asia.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PRETORIA, 13 MAY 1998

MEDIA STATEMENT ON PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS

South Africa deeply concerned at the Pakistani nuclear tests.

The South African Government has noted with deep concern the reported nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan this morning. South Africa had appealed for restraint from Pakistan following the recent tests by India.

As a matter of principle South Africa opposes all nuclear tests since they do not contribute to promoting world peace and security. South Africa believes that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation.

South Africa repeats the hope that these tests do not result in an arms race in South Asia.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PRETORIA
28 MAY 1998

MEDIA STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA ON THE ADDITIONAL TWO NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN

South Africa has noted with deepening concern the two further nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan on 30 May 1998.

South Africa is gravely disappointed at this development and restates its well known position that it opposes and will continue to oppose all nuclear tests irrespective of source.

South Africa holds firm to the view that world security is derived from nuclear disarmament and not nuclear proliferation.

An escalating arms race in South Asia remains of deep concern to South Africa.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PRETORIA
30 MAY 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1542
11 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH
and SPANISH

LETTER DATED 10 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH TEXTS OF THE JOINT DECLARATION RELATING TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT OF 9 JUNE 1998 BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND SWEDEN

I have the honour to transmit to you the English and Spanish texts of the Joint Declaration relating to nuclear disarmament of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

I shall be grateful if the Joint Declaration is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Lars Norberg
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF

BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND SLOVANIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND SWEDEN

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states, as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.

2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again."

3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.

4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.

5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistant reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.

9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches.

11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the NPT, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.

13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint

no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1543
15 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY PAKISTAN'S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 11 JUNE 1998 REGARDING PAKISTAN'S PROPOSAL FOR RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WITH INDIA

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement issued by Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 11 June 1998 regarding Pakistan's proposal for resumption of dialogue with India which may kindly be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-62498

PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PAKISTAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JUNE 11, 1998

"Pakistan's desire to engage constructively in a substantive and a result oriented dialogue with India has repeatedly been affirmed by the Prime Minister.

Accordingly, the Foreign Secretary today, officially conveyed to the Indian High Commissioner, Pakistan's proposal for resumption of Pakistan-India dialogue on the basis of the agreement reached on 23 June, 1997 between the two sides.

Pakistan has proposed that in view of the current situation, the two sides should address, on a priority basis, the issues of Peace and Security and Jammu and Kashmir in the resumed talks.

Pakistan has also proposed that under the item pertaining to Peace and Security, special and urgent attention may be given to arriving at mutually agreed measures for the avoidance of conflict as well as promotion of nuclear and conventional restraint and stabilisation measures.

Pakistan believes that simultaneously with the bilateral dialogue the international community will remain engaged with the comprehensive political process of stabilisation of nuclearized South Asia and finding of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute as promised by the P-5 Foreign Ministers in their Joint Communique issued in Geneva on June 4, 1998. The UN Security Council has also mandated the Secretary General to remain engaged in these efforts. In a letter addressed to the Prime Minister on June 10, the Secretary General has offered to encourage and facilitate this process. Islamabad now awaits the Secretary General's Personal Envoy's visit to Pakistan.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1544
19 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH
FRENCH and SPANISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AT ITS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 8 JUNE

I have the honour to transmit a copy of the text of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council of the European Union at its meeting in Luxembourg on 8 June.

I should be grateful if the text could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Ian Soutar
Ambassador

GE.98-62511

EUROPEAN UNION CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS

The Council of the European Union,

BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,

RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,

DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,

DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,

WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,

NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,

ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,

RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter,

have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:

CRITERION ONE

Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

a) the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes;

b) the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;

c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;

d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel

landmine

CRITERION TWO

The respect of human rights in the country of final destination

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will:

a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.

b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU;

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

CRITERION THREE

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts

Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

CRITERION FOUR

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability

Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia:

a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;

b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;

c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;

d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.

CRITERION FIVE

The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries

Member States will take into account:

a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;

b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states;

c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

CRITERION SIX

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law

Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to:

a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;

b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;

c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

CRITERION SEVEN

The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;

b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;

c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;

d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).

CRITERION EIGHT

The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources

Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

OPERATIVE PROVISIONS

1. Each EU Member State will assess export licence applications for military equipment made to it on a case-by-case basis against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.

2. This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.

3. EU Member States will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

4. EU Member States will keep such denials and consultations confidential and not to use them for commercial advantage.

5. EU Member States will work for the early adoption of a common list of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where

appropriate elements from relevant international lists.

6. The criteria in this Code and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions will also apply to dual-use goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

7. In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports.

8. Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an annual report on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States..

9. EU Member States will, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.

10. It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.

11. EU Member States will use their best endeavours to encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct.

12. This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.

ANNEX A to ANNEX

..... (name of Member State) has the honour to inform partners of the following denial under the EU Code of Conduct:

Destination country:.....

Short description of equipment, including quantity and where appropriate, technical specifications:.....

Proposed consignee:.....

Proposed end-user (if different):.....

Reason for refusal:.....

Date of denial:.....